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AN ANALYSIS OF THE EARNINGS OF CANADIANIMMIGRANTS
ABSTRACT
Thispaper reports estimates of simple wage equations fit
to cross-sectional and pseudo-longitudinal data for Canadian
immigrants in the 1971 and 1981 Canadian censuses.The
estimates are used to assess (1) the usefulness of cross-
sectional analyses for measuring the pace of immigrant earnings
growth, (2) the labor market implications of admissions
policies that place different weights on the work skills
possessed by prospective entrants, and (3) the relative impact
of selective outmigration and job-matching on the shape of
immigrant earnings distributions as duration of stay increases.
The estimates provide evidence of a small to moderate
assimilation effect that suggests that immigrants make up for
relatively low entry wages, although the wage catch-up is not
complete until 13 to 22 years after entry into Canada.These
results are revealed clearly in both the pseudo-longitudinal
and the cross-sectional analyses.The estimates also provide
evidence that the unobserved quality of immigrants' labor
market skills declined following changes in Canada's
immigration policies in 1974 that led to a sharp increase in
the proportion of immigrants admitted on the basis of family
ties.Finally, since there is no evidence that the variance of
immigrant earnings increases with their duration of stay in
Canada, and since there are no differential immigrant-native
changes in higher-order moments of the earnings distribution as
duration of stay increases, the results are inconclusive with
respect to the importance of selective outmigration and job
matching in the evolution of immigrant earnings distributions
over time.
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(416)978-5398The purpose of this paper is to analyze immigrant labor market progress
in Canada --acountry that has screened most of its immigrants on the basis
of their expected "ability to assimilate" as a matter of official policy.
In particular, we compare earnings profiles for Canadian immigrants and
natives and seek to determine whether immigrant earnings profiles reflect
any "vintage effects" associated with year of immigration.
Over the past 10 years, a number of studies of immigrant earnings have
focused on these same issues using data for U.S.immigrants.Among the best
known is that by Chiswick (1978) which fits a standard wage equation to
cross-sectional data on immigrants and natives in the 1970 Public Use Sample
of the U.S. Census.Chiswick's results support the conclusion that, when
they first enter the labor market, immigrants earn approximately 25 percent
less than natives with comparable years of schooling and experience, marital
status, etc.However, Chiswick also finds that immigrants have steeper
experience-earnings profiles than "comparable" natives, with immigrant
earnings overtaking native earnings within roughly 13 years of their entry
into the U.S.A number of other studies have fit the same basic model to
similar data and have reached roughly identical conclusions (see, for
example, Carliner, 1980; Long, 1980; and Borjas, 1982).
The set of findings based on Chiswick's approach to measuring imniigrant
assimilation has been challenged by Borjas (1985) who argues that the
steepness of immigrant earnings profiles is inflated by cross-cohort
declines in immigrant quality.Evidence supporting this argument is
provided by using pooled data from the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Population
Censuses to measure earnings growth in the intercensal period for individual
entry cohorts of immigrants.Based on this analysis, Borjas concludes that"cross-section studies of inunigrant earnings provide useless and misleading
insights into the process of immigrant assimilation into the labor market"
(p. 485).
Borjas' conclusion is deserving of further examination.A prj&ri
theoretical reasoning is perhaps more consistent with Chiswick's empirical
conclusions than they are with those of Borjas.Low entry wages for
immigrants can plausibly be explained as a loss of (origin) country-specific
human capital; rapid earnings growth can be viewed as reflecting positive
self-selection into immigration (i.e. ,immigrantsare above-average in terms
of their aggressiveness, ambitiousness, willingness-to-work hard, etc.).In
contrast, sizable cross-cohort declines in immigrant quality are somewhat
harder to accept given that it is not overall quality that is hypothesized
to have declined, but rather that component of overall quality that is
unmeasured (i.e., the part of immigrant quality that is not measured by or
correlated with variables such as schooling, experience, marital status,
country of origin, etc.).Borjas' results, as he recognizes, may also be
reflective of differential patterns of underenumeration in the successive
censuses, or non-random intercensal mortality and outinigration.Indeed,
outmigration, death, or undercounting of immigrants who are relatively
unsuccessful in the labor market are all alternatives to declining immigrant
quality as an explanation of Chiswick's cross-sectional results.
We will also use the example of Canada as an opportunity to gain some
insight into the importance of intercensal exiting from an immigrant
population.Although there is little information on either the covariates
of immigrant mortality or on differential census undercounting of
immigrants, there are several established lines of inquiry on the subject of
outmigration.According to a group of imperfect information models,
outmigration is an event that was unplanned ex ante and that occurs
2primarily among migrants whose labor market expectations are not satisfied
(see Yezer and Thurston, 1976; Allen, 1919; flejer and Goldberg, 1980;and
Lam, 1986).These models suggest, at the margin, that outmigrants will tend
to be selected from the lower end of the earnings distribution.On the
other hand, intertemporal substitution models tend to view outmigration as a
planned event among individuals who make short-term moves in order to take
maximal advantage of temporarily favorable earnings opportunities (Stark and
Bloom, 1986; Fox, 1987).These models suggest that outmigration will be
most prevalent among individuals who are relatively active and successful in
the labor market.Although the results are far from definitive, empirical
research by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1987, 1989) and by Lam (1987) tends to
support this view insofar as outmigration of U.S. and Canadian immigrants is
reported to be most prevalent among those who are relatively successful.
Although they are extremely different in spirit, both the imperfect
information and the intertemporal substitution models of outmigration share
an important empirical implication, namely, that the variance of residuals
in a migrant earnings equation will decline with duration of stay (i.e.,
under the imperfect information models exit occurs at the lower end of the
distribution while under the intertemporal substitution models exit occurs
at the upper end).In contrast, job matching or asymmetric information
models imply that the residual variance in a wage equation will increase
with duration of stay as employers are increasingly able to observe the true
productivity of migrants (see Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Katz and Stark,
1984).We attempt to infer which set of forces tends to be stronger by
examining patterns in the variance and kurtosis of immigrant earnings by
duration of stay.For example, we will interpret an increase (decrease) in
the variance of earnings with duration of stay as evidence favoring the
3relative importance of the job matching modela (imperfect information
models).
Thus, we have four main goals in this paper.First, by fitting the
models proposed by both Chiswick and Borjas to data for Canada, we hope to
assess the extent to which it is generally true that cross-sectional studies
of immigrant earnings are "useless and misleading."Second, we hope that
estimates of these alternative models will lead to clear substantive
conclusions regarding the shape of immigrant earnings profiles and the
importance of entry-cohort effects on earnings.Third,by comparing
corresponding results under different Canadian immigration policies, we hope
to shed some light on the significance of a nation's institutions in
determining the economic benefits of immigration.Finally, by analyzing the
variance of immigrant earnings by duration of stay in Canada, we hope to
assess the relative importance of selective intercensal exiting and job-
matching/asymmetric information in models of the labor market progress of
immigrants.
I.Immigration Policy and Immigrants in Canada
In an effort to enrich our interpretation of statistics related to the
labor market experience of Canadian immigrants, this section will present a
brief review of the history of Canadian immigration policy and of
immigration to Canada.
A.Brief History of Canadian Immigration Policy
From the 19th to the 20th century, international migration to developed
countries has been determined less and less by events and decisions of
individuals in countries of origin and more and more by regulations
established in countries of destination.In this regard, Canada is no
4exception.Until 1869, Canada's immigration policy was simply one of free
entry.But beginning that year, a series of legislative enactments
established specific principles of selection and associated regulatory
apparatuses.Prohibitions were established on the landing of "criminals and
other vicious classes" in 1872, paupers and destitute immigrants in 1879,
and diseased persons in 1902.In 1904 an exorbitant head tax of $50
(Canadian) was established for Chinese immigrants.During this period of
years, the central government also set up quarantine stations, specified
legal responsibilities for companies involved in transporting immigrants,
and began to require those companies to make deposits into a fund whose
purpose was to cover the expenses of indigent immigrants before they were
able to secure employment.
The basic structure of Canadian immigration policy during much of the
first half of the 20th century was set forth in the Immigration Act of 1910.
This Act firmly established the principle of selective immiaration by
creating a proscribed class of immigrants:those "deemed undesirable
because of climatic, industrial, social, educational, labour, or other
conditions or requirements of Canada, or deemed undesirable because of their
customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property and their
probable ability to become readily assimilated."In practical terms, this
Act led to a distinction between countries in the extent to which they were
considered to be "preferred" or "non-preferred."The two most preferred
countries were the United Kingdom and the United States (and France as of
1947); they were followed by several other countries in northern and western
Europe that were "not too different [from Canada] in language and mode of
life;" countries in central and eastern Europe were considered to be non-
preferred, with the most non-preferred countries being Greece, Italy, Syria,
and Turkey.Immigrants from Asian countries were considered so undesirable
5that their admission was strictly regulated under separate Acts.
Subject to time-varying restrictions on total immigrant volume,
applicants from the most preferred countries were admitted on almost a
laissez-faire basis while the admission of immigrants from other preferred
countries depended to varying degrees on whether they possessed training and
skills for which there was a need in Canada.Only immigrants in a
relatively narrow range of occupations (e.g. ,agriculture)were admissible
from non-preferred countries, and the range of relatives they could bring
with them was quite limited.
One of the chief characteristics of twentieth century immigration
policy in Canada is its strong labor market orientation.In a broad
statement outlining the principles that have guided Canadian immigration
policy throughout the post-World War II era, Prime Minister MacKenzie King
declared in 1947 that Canada would encourage immigration to meet its need
for population.He said further that Canada would accept as many immigrants
"as could be advantageously absorbed into the national economy,' with the
admissibility of potential immigrants to Canada depending upon, among other
factors, labor conditions and requirements in Canada and each applicant's
'ability to assimilate."King also affirmed the discriminatory features of
Canada's immigration policy, stating that "the people of Canada do not wish,
as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the
character of our population.'"Canada is perfectly within her rights in
selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens.It is
not a 'fundamental human right' of ay alien to enter Canada.It is a
privilege.It is a matter of domestic policy...."
Because control over the volume of immigrants to Canada and over their
national and occupational composition resided in the hands of the Cabinet,
6immigration policy in Canada has been remarkably responsive to a variety of
social, economic, and political situations throughout most of this century.
For example, immigration was tightly restricted during the high unemployment
years of the 1930's, immigrants were not accepted from Japan, Germany, or
Italy during World War II although many displaced Europeans were admitted
from other countries, and Canada actively assisted and accepted many
immigrants from Hungary during 1957.
Canadian immigration policy has often been referred to as a "tap-on,
tap-off policy" because of its flexibility jnj,flresponsiveness Q
contemporary market concerns.For example, the admission of
immigrants was increased sharply as a response to labor shortages in the
1950's, but was curtailed during the years 1958-1962 due to high rates of
unemployment.Beginning in the 1950's, immigration officials treated
professionals and entrepreneurs with capital quite favorably because of
their potential to generate employment opportunities in Canada.Indeed,
Canada abandoned its policy of national discrimination in the 1960's partly
because it became increasingly clear that Canada would not be able to
satisfy its need for skilled manpower via immigration from its list of
preferred countries.
In 1967, Canada substantially altered the mechanisms by which it
administered its immigration policies.First, it eliminated all
discrimination on the basis of race or nationality.Second, it defined four
classes of immigrant applications:(1) sponsored relatives (i.e., dependent
relatives); (2) nominated relatives; (3) independent applications; and (4)
refugees: Sponsored relatives would be admissible merely if they could
demonstrate that they were in good health and of good character.Refugees,
a status defined by the United Nations, would be accorded preferential
treatment in admission.Finally, nominated relatives and independent
7applications would be judged on the basis of a point system.
The two key features of the point system are that it removed a good
deal of subjective authority from the hands of immigration officers and it
assigned considerable weight in admissions decisions to labor-market related
factors.In order to be admitted under the point system, an immigrant
needed to receive at least 50 points out of a maximum of 100.Points were
awarded according to the following 9 criteria, with some minor differences
in the evaluation of independent applications and applications from
nominated relatives:
(1)Education and training:1 point for each year of successful
formal education or occupational training, up to a maximum of 20;
(2)Personal characteristics:Up to 15 points awarded at the
discretion of immigration officers on the basis of their
perception of the applicant's adaptability, resourcefulness,
initiative, and motivation;
(3)Occupational demand:up to 15 points, both for skilled and
unskilled workers;
(4)Occupational skill:ranging from 1 point for unskilled workers
up to 10 points for professionals;
(5)Age:10 points for applicants below the age of 35, with 1
point less for each year above age 35 (with a minimum of 0
points);
(6)Arranged employment:10 points for applicants with a definite
job in Canada;
(7)Knowledge of French and English:Up to 10 points depending on
an applicant's fluency in French and English;
(8)Relatives:up to S points for applicants with relatives in
Canada that could help them to get established;
(9)Employment opportunities:up to 5 points for applicants moving
to areas of strong labor demand.
The point system was amended in 1974, as a response to both the large
number of immigrants admitted to Canada in 1972 and 1973 and to increases in
the unemployment rate in Canada.A priority system was established for
8processing immigrant applications that gave preferential treatment to
applicants with close relatives in Canada, applicants with prearranged
employment in high-demand occupationsand to entrepreneurs and refugees.A
"Canadians-first" policy was also established under which applicants would
receive no credit for prearranged employment unless they could show that no
equally-qualified Canadian citizen or landed immigrant was available to fill
the position.In addition, an applicant would lose 10 points if there was
no evidence of pre-arranged employment or bona fide demand for their labor.
The figures in Table 1 indicate that a sharp increase occurred in the
proportion of Canadian immigrants admitted on the basis of family ties
following the 1974 policy changes.
B.Trends j4 Patterns inImmigration Canada
The foreign-born have constituted a sizable fraction of the Canadian
population throughout the twentieth century.In 1901, 13.3 percent of the
Canadian population was foreign-born.This fraction increased sharply
during the first decade of the century and hovered around 22 percent into
the 1930's, when difficult economic circumstances led to restrictive
immigration policies that caused it to decline.Nonetheless, the foreign-
born fraction of the Canadian population had not fallen below 15 percent
through the early 1980's (see Table 2).
In order to maintain such a high fraction of foreign-born among the
Canadian population, immigration flows into Canada have been quite
substantial.For example, there were 4.4 million immigrants to Canada from
1951 to 1981, a period during which the population of Canada increased from
14 to 24 million.Although the ratio of new immigrants to the overall
increase in the size of Canada's population has been above 15 percent during
every year in the post-World War II era, there has been a great deal of
9year-to-year variation in the number of immigrants.Especially large
numbers of immigrants arrived in Canada in 1951 (194,391), 1957 (282,164),
1967 (222,876) and 1974 (218,465); in contrast, relatively few immigrants
arrived in 1946-47 (roughly 68,000 immigrants per year), 1961-62 (roughly
73,000 immigrants per year), 1978 (86,300), and 1983 (88,800).
From the mid-1950's to the mid-1970's, the percent of Canadian
immigrants intending to enter the labor force was just above 50 percent.
That figure dropped to 44 percent starting in the mid-1970s, as the number
of admissions from independent applications dropped from nearly 110,000 in
1974 to under 21,000 in 1984.Even more dramatic has been the shift in the
distribution of occupations among immigrants expecting to enter the labor
force.This shift has been notably in the direction of increased skill and
training.Among immigrants entering Canada during 1954-58, only 12 percent
listed their intended occupations as managers or professionals.In
contrast, 37 percent listed agricultural worker, laborer, or service worker
as their intended occupation.During the years 1979-83, the percent of
managers and professionals increased to 28 percent while only 14 percent of
immigrants reported that they intended to work as agricultural workers,
laborers, or service workers.While some portion of these changes
undoubtedly reflect sectoral shift in the Canadian economy, the bulk of the
changes are reflective of the increased emphasis on skill and training in
Canada's immigration policy (see Table 3).
Table 4 presents a crosstabulation of the foreign-born population of
Canada by their country of origin and their year of immigration.The data
are taken from the 1981 Canadian Census.The figures clearly show that
British and American immigrants dominated the immigration flow to Canada
before 1946 (i.e., in 1981, 61 percent of all pre-1946 immigrants in Canada
were from the U.K. or the U.S.).That dominance ended immediately following
10World War II as immigration from Europe (excluding the U.K.) expanded
sharply.From 1946 to 1955, 68 percent of all immigrants to Canada were
from Europe (excluding the U.K.), up from just 37 percent prior to 1946.
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands alone supplied an especially large
proportion of immigrants in the ten years following the war (36 percent).
Even in absolute terms, no European country increased the number of
immigrants it supplied to Canada during the post-War period, whereas the
number of immigrants from most European countries actually declined (i.e.,
based on numbers of immigrants actually in Canada in 1981).
Table 4 also shows that the pattern of immigration to Canada changed
rather dramatically when Canada stopped discriminating among immigrants on
the basis of their countries of origin.For example, between the first and
second half of the 1960's, immigration to Canada from Asia and Latin America
increased nearly four-fold.Although these regions of the world supplied
only 2 percent of Canada's immigrants prior to 1946, they supplied 46
percent from 1971 to 1975 and 55 percent from 1976 to 1981.
C.Immigrants iii the Canadian JkMarket
We next present a brief descriptive analysis of the employment,
unemployment, and earnings experience of male immigrants represented in the
1971 and 1981 Canadian population censuses.
Table S reports selected labor market characteristics of immigrants and
natives based on data contained in the 1981 Canadian Census of Population.
Judging merely, on the basis of labor market activity measures, it would not
be unreasonable to conclude that Canadian immigrants are well assimilated in
the labor market.The labor force participation rate of male immigrants
(aged 1S and over) was 72.4 percent in 1981, just slightly below the rate of
73.6 percent for native Canadians.The closeness of native and immigrant
1].labor supply extends beyond labor force participation rates to hours and
weeks worked as well.Ninety-three percent of immigrant males worked 35 or
more hours during the 1981 Census reference week, compared to 92 percent of
native males.Similarly, 70.6 percent of the male immigrants reported
having worked 49 to 52 weeks in 1980, just .2 percentage points higher than
the figure for native males.Despite the closeness in these measures of
immigrant and native labor supply, unemployment rates for immigrants were
notably lower than for natives in 1981 (i.e. ,amongmales, the unemployment
rates were 8.5 percent for natives and 5.3 percent for immigrants).These
differentials could reflect a variety of factors including differences in
reservation wages, human capital, and demographic composition (see Fox, 1987
for an analysis of immigrant labor supply and unemployment in Canada).
Presumably, such factors also underlie the explanation of the difference in
average income between male immigrants and natives (i.e. ,theimmigrants had
a 7.4 percent advantage).It is also worth noting that rates of self-
employment are slightly higher among immigrants than among natives, with 15
percent of immigrant males reporting that they were self-employed in 1981
(compared to 13 percent for native males).
Table 6 compares labor force participation rates, unemployment rates,
and levels of average income among different entry cohorts of Canadian
immigrants --usingdata from both the 1971 and 1981 Canadian censuses.The
statistics show that the more recent immigrants have relatively low labor
force participation rates, relatively low average income, and relatively
high unemployment rates.Labor force participation rates are also
relatively low in both censuses for pre-1946 immigrants, presumably because
many immigrants in that cohort had reached retirement age by 1971 and 1981.
Although labor force participation rates are quite flat across the cohorts
12of immigrants that entered Canada between 1946 and 1975, it does appear that
unemployment rates are higher for the more recent cohorts.Average
immigrant earnings also tend to be lower for immigrants in the more recent
entry cohorts.
Thus, while there do not seem to be major differences in the employment
and earnings experiences of immigrants and natives in Canada, there are
notable differences between immigrants in different entry cohorts.Whether
these differences represent genuine vintage effects or simply reflect the
influence of immigrant labor market characteristics or other variables
cannot be determined from these tables.Making such a determination
requires that we control for a variety of variables in a multivariate
manner, which we turn to in the following section.
II.Emir1ca1 Analysis Immigrant Earninas Profiles
In this section, we will analyze earnings patterns among Canadian
immigrants using data contained in the 1971 and 1981 Canadian censuses.Our
goal is to answer the following three questions;
(1) On average, do employed immigrants receive higher wages than
employed natives who are comparable in terms of observed productivity-
related characteristics?
(2) On average, do employed immigrants who have been in Canada for a
total of X years receive higher or lower wages than employed immigrants who
have been in Canada for flY years but who are otherwise comparable in terms
of observed characteristics? and
(3) Does the dispersion of immigrant earnings tend to vary with
duration of stay?
13A.Empirical Models and Data Issues
The standard model used to compare earnings profiles for immigrants and
natives was proposed by Chiswick (1978).The basic regression model, which
is fit to cross-sectional data for a pooled sample of both immigrants and
natives, is a simple extension of the standard human capital earnings
function:
log Ya0 ÷a1(SCH)÷a2(EXP)÷a3(EXPSQ)+a4(IMMIG)÷a5(YSM)
where Y is earnings, SCH is years of schooling, EXP is years of labor market
experience, EXPSQ is years of labor market experience squared, INMIG is an
indicator variable for immigrants, and YSM is years since migration
interacted with the immigrant dummy variable.The estimate of a4 measures
the average percent difference betweeen the earnings of natives and newly
arrived, but otherwise comparable, immigrants.The estimate of a5 measures
the average percent increase in immigrant earnings with each year they spend
in their new home country, beyond the increase in earnings associated with
the fact that their human capital stock may have changed during that year
(e.g., EXP may have increased).Thus, a positive estimate of a5 has been
taken to indicate that the average experience-earnings profile of immigrants
is steeper than that of natives, which is suggestive of labor market
progress and assimilation.
Borjas (1985) has recently pointed out that interpreting the
coefficients in equation (1) in this manner requires one to assume that
there are no omitted variables that are correlated with YSM.This
assumption may be difficult to defend because YSM also measures tidate of
entry into the new country't in a cross-sectional regression.If unmeasured
factors relevant to labor market success vary systematically across entry
cohorts of immigrants, the coefficient a5 will measure both immigrant labor
14market progress and the effect of the average difference in unmeasured
factors across successive entry cohorts (i.e.it may be a biased measure of
the labor market progress experienced by different entry cohorts over time).
The most straightforward way to overcome the fact that YSM is a linear
combination of a vector of year-of-immigration dummy variables in cross-
sectional data is to make use of longitudinal data.Since longitudinal data
provide observations on each entry cohort at two or more points in time, it
is possible to estimate the effect of time spent in the new country on
earnings without the potentially confounding influence of entry cohort
effects (i.e., a regression model can be specified with year-of-immigration
dummy variables and YSM on the right-hand side because the same individual
in a particular entry cohort, with an immutable "year of entry," will have
different values of YSM when he is observed at different points in time).
To our knowledge there are no sets of longitudinal data for Canada that
are suitable for conducting such an analysis.Thus, following Borjas, we
will construct a pseudo-longitudinal dataset for different entry cohorts of
immigrants using data contained in the 1971 and 1981 Canadian Population
Censuses.We will fit the following regression model to pooled data from
these two censuses:
log Y —b0+b1(SCH)+b2(EXP)+b3(EXPSQ)+b4(IMMIG)+b5(YSM)
+c1(C0111)+... + ck(COHk) (2)
where COH1 through CORk are indicator variables reflecting immigrant
membership in different entry cohorts.In principle, fitting this
regression provides estimates of cohort-specific effects on earnings as well
as an estimate of the average rate of earnings growth that is free of entry-
cohort bias (i.e. ,anestimate of earnthzs growth within -- across -
15- jycohorts).
Several features of this econometric approach should be kept in mind.
First, it cannot be used to estimate individual-specific effects on earnings
because there is no information to link the same individuals in the
different cross-sections.Second, a particular entry cohort sample observed
in 1971 is not necessarily representative of the same population as the
corresponding sample that is observed in 1981.As noted earlier, non-random
patterns of outmigration, mortality, and differential undercounting --of
which we find some evidence in our data as well as in Lam (1987)--will
tend to undermine the comparability of the samples.Changing patterns of
employment and self-employment pose similar problems insofar as our
regressions are fit to samples of working individuals who earned their
income primarily from wages and salaries.Third, because only two cross-
sections are available for the present analysis, we will not be able to
control for period effects that may affect the earnings of different cohorts
differently (e.g., the business cycle).
Also deserving of mention are two issues tasted by the pooling of data
from two cross-sectional samples.First, in order to meaningfully compare
earnings in the 1971 and 1981 censuses, it is necessary to make an
adjustment for inflation.We do this by using the Canadian Consumer Price
Index to transform earnings in the 1971 census (that refer to the year 1970)
into 1980 inflation-adjusted dollars (the multiplication factor is 2.17).
Second, intercensal changes in the real earnings of immigrants may be partly
due to changing capital-to-labor ratios, technological change, or business
cycle fluctuations.Since real wage growth due to these factors is not
reflective of labor market progress that is immigrant-specific,- we make an
adjustment to the real earnings of immigrants in the 1971 census that
transforms those data into "productivity-constant" terms.These adjustments
16highlight our central interest in this section:measuring the component of
intercensal earnings growth for different entry cohorts of immigrants that
is independent of human capital accumulation, overall economic growth,
business cycle effects, inflation, etc.
In order to explore the robustness of our results, we make two
distinctly different types of productivity adjustments.First, we simply
multiply inunigrant earnings reported in the 1971 census by the ratio of real
earnings received by native Canadians in the 1981 and 1971 censuses (the
multiplication factor is 1.20).This simple adjustment assumes that
immigrants would have experienced the same real wage growth as natives in
the absence of any assimilation effects.At a somewhat deeper level, it
assumes that average levels of human capital did not change among natives
relative to inunigrants and that the structure of returns to different types
of human capital also did not change between censuses.To avoid these
assumptions, we also employ a slightly more complex productivity adjustment
that takes account of changes in the human capital profile of the inunigrant
and native labor forces and of changes in the returns to different types of
human capital.We do this by (a) estimating real wage equations for natives
in 1971 and 1981 and (b) using the difference in the estimated coefficients
to adjust immigrants' 1971 wages for intercensal changes in the returns to
different types of human capital.We report results based on both sets of
adjustments below.
B.Emuirical Results g Earninr.s
The immigrants we analyze represent l-in-l00 samples of individuals
born outside of Canada while- the natives represent l-in-600 samples of
individuals reporting Canada as their place of birth.Both the immigrant
and native samples are restricted to individuals aged 20-64 who are not
17predominantly self-employed and who worked at some point during the year
prior to the census for a wage in excess of 50 cents per hour in the 1971
census and one dollar per hour in the 1981 census.The variables 114144650
through 1MM7680 refer to immigrant entry cohorts (e.g., year of entry from
1946 to 1950, etc.).
Table 8 presents ordinary-least-squares estimates of wage equations
using cross-sectional data from 1971 and 1981 separately.The dependent
variable in all equations is the natural logarithm of an individual's wage
and salary earnings in inflation-adjusted (1980) dollars during the year
preceding the census (i.e., 1970 and 1980).These equations were specified
with schooling (SCH), experience (EXP and EXPSQ)marital status (MST), and
vectors of categorical variables (not reported in the table) measuring hours
worked per week and weeks worked per year as right-hand-side variables.
Depending on the specification, the wage equations may also include an
indicator variable for immigrants (114141G) and a variable measuring the
number of years an immigrant has been in Canada (YSM).Although not
reported in these tables, we also estimated models with additional right-
hand-side variables reflecting an individual's religion and language ability
and the square of YSM.Since these latter variables had little explanatory
power either individually or jointly, these specifications are not reported
here in the interest of parsimony.
The first two columns of Table 8 report wage equation estimates for the
samples of male immigrants in 1971 and 1981.The estimated equations have
the basic structure one might expect:a 4 to 5 percent rate of return to
schooling, an earnings-experience profile that increases at a decreasing
rate, and a 15 to 25 percent positive wage differential for married men.In
addition, the "years since migration" coefficients are positive and
18significantly different from zero, although the coefficients arerather
small in magnitude (i.e., about .5 percent per year).
The third and fourth columns of Table 8 report estimates ofsimilar
equations for native Canadians.The pattern of results corresponds quite
closely to those for the immigrants, although the rate of return to
schooling is slightly higher for natives than for immigrants, probably
indicating that schooling has an important country-specific component.Even
the residual variances for the immigrant and native wage equations arequite
close in magnitude (e.g. ,.20for the imnhigr4nts and .21 for the natives in
the 1971 census data).
Given the closeness of the estimated wage equations for theimmigrants
and the natives, a simple way to compare the wage profilesis to follow the
work of Chiswick (1978) by pooling the data for the two groups andfitting a
wage equation that includes a dummy variable forimmigrants, both by itself
and interacted with the "years since migration" variable.The results of
this exercise are presented in the last two coLumns of Table 8.Based on
the 1971 data, the estimate of the immigrant coefficient indicatesthat
immigrants earn roughly 7 percent less than comparable nativeswhen they
first arrive in Canada; the estimate of the coefficient on YSM indicates
that immigrants' wages increase an average of .54 percent per year spentin
Canada, beyond the increase associated with the acquisition ofexperience.
These estimates imply that the earnings profiles of comparableimmigrants
and natives cross at roughly 12.8 years.In contrast, the 1981 data
indicate that entering immigrants earn 16.6 percent less thanotherwise
comparable natives, although their wages increase at the rate of .77 percent
per year spent in Canada suggesting thatthe immigrant and native earnings
profiles do not cross until the immigrants have been in Canadafor 21.6
years.
19In order to investigate whether the various cross-sectional estimates
of immigrant labor market progress are biased by entry-cohort effects on
wages, we now estimate alternative models from pooled 1971 and 1981 data on
immigrants.The first column of results in Table 9 reports estimates of the
simple wage equation fit to the pooled data.As one would expect, these
estimates are quite similar to the estimates computed for the separate
years' samples (i.e., they are simply a matrix-weighted average of the
results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8).In the second column, we include a
vector of dummy variables that reflect an immigrant's entry cohort.The
coefficient of YSM in this equation therefore represents a weighted average
of within-cohort real earnings growth between 1971 and 1981 for the
different entry cohorts, other things equal.The estimate of this
coefficient is quite substantial in magnitude (2.02 percent) and is quite
well-determined (i.e., the standard error is.08 percent).Thus, the
within-cohort growth rate of real earnings is three to five times larger
than the cross-cohort growth rate of real earnings.In addition, estimates
of the cohort fixed effects suggest that the average unmeasured quality of
immigrants increased across all entry cohorts until the cohort that entered
from 1976 to 1980.
As noted earlier, the coefficient on YSM captures both the true
"assimilation effect" in which we are interested, as well any wage growth
associated with changes taking place in the economy over time (e.g.
increasing capital-to-labor ratios).In order to isolate the assimilation
effect, we adjust the 1971 earnings data for changes in labor productivity
that occurred among native Canadians from 1971 to 1981.Estimates of the
wage equation fit to these productivity-adjusted data are reported in the
third and fourth columns of Table 9.The third column applies the simple
20adjustment described above based on the ratio of real wages received by
native Canadians in 1971 and 1981; the fourth column applies the more
complex regression-based adjustment that accounts br humancapitalchanges
among the immigrant and native labor forces as well as changes in the
returns to different types of human capital.
The coefficient of YSM reported in column 3 is .24 (with a standard
error of .08).Although it is statistically significant, this estimate is
substantially smaller than the estimate of 2.02 computed using non-
productivity-adjusted data.Thus, it appears that the effect of
assimilation on the earnings of pseudo-cohorts of immigrants is quite small,
indeed, almost negligible.Put another way, within-cohort growth in
immigrant earnings is primarily due to economic forces that affect both
immigrants and natives.Further confirmation of this result is provided in
the fourth column of Table 9.Although the estimated coefficient of YSM is
somewhat larger when we apply the more elaborate productivity adjustment,
the assimilation effect of .42 percent per year is still substantively
small.Moreover, it is sufficiently close in magnitude to the estimates
computed from the individual cross-sections to justify taking issue with
Sorjas' assertion that estimates of the latter type are "misleading and
useless."
It is also worth examining the estimates of the cohort fixed effects in
columns 3 and 4 in Table 9.There are no statistically significant cohort
effects among any of the five pre-1971 entry cohorts of immigrants.
However, the estimates do suggest that average unobserved quality among
immigrants arriving from 1976 to 1980 (and perhaps also among the 1971 to
1975 arrivals) was significaxitly lower than for previous cohorts, the same
conclusion suggested by a comparison of the cross-sectional coefficient
estimates of IMMIG in Table 8.This result is not especially surprising
21given the relatively high fraction of immigrants admitted into Canada as
relatives of Canadian citizens and landed immigrants in the late 1970's (see
Table 1).Under the immigration policy in effect in Canada in the 1970's,
applications from relatives did not receive the same degree of labor market
screening as independent applications.
C. Dispersion g. Iminizrant Earnings
In this subsection we present and review statistics on the dispersion
of income among immigrants.In particular, we are interested in determining
whether immigrant incomes tend to become more or less disperse as the
duration of their stay in Canada increases.A tendency for dispersion to
decline with duration of stay is consistent with the hypothesis that
intercensal outmigrants tend to be selected from the tails of the
distribution (i.e., immigrants whose earnings expectations were not met
selected out of the lower tail while migrants who planned temporary stays to
take advantage of favorable earnings opportunities selected out of the upper
tail).In contrast, a tendency for dispersion to increase with duration of
stay would be consistent with the view that the labor market has more
information about the true productivity of immigrants the longer they have
stayed in the country.
The third and fourth columns of Table 10 report the raw standard
deviations of immigrant incomes by the duration of their stay in Canada as
of both 1971 and 1981.Although the standard deviation of income is highest
for the oldest entry cohort of immigrants, there is little evidence of a
pattern across the more recent entry cohorts in either census year.There
is some tendency for income dispersion to decrease for individual entry
cohorts from 1971 to 1981, but this may not be due to increased duration of
stay since income dispersion among native Canadians also decreased between
221971 and 1981.In addition, it is worth noting that the standard deviation
of immigrant incomes is remarkably close to the standard deviation of native
incomes in both census years.Table 10 also reports the standard deviation
of the estimated residuals for different entry cohorts of immigrants in the
1971 and 1981 censuses.These statistics are more appropriate measures of
dispersion than the raw standard deviations because they do not reflect the
influence of variations in observable factors that are associated with
earnings.Nonetheless, they tell basically the identical story to that told
by the unconditional measures of dispersion:there is no substantial
evidence of a difference between natives and immigrants, or among immigrants
with different durations of stay in Canada, in the dispersion of income.
Thus, the statistics in Table 10 are equally supportive of two conclusions:
first, that selective outmigration and job matching are both empirically
unimportant influences on immigrant earnings, and second, that they are
important influences whose effects tend to cancel out.
In an attempt to distinguish between these alternative views, we
examine higher-order moments in the distribution of residuals from the
earnings equation.If the tails of the distribution are thinning as a
result of outmigration j4ifthe variance of earnings is increasing among
Canadian immigrants who stay in Canada, we would expect increased kurtosis
in the distribution of residuals for particular entry cohorts, i.e., the
distributions should "thicken" from one census to the next.This pattern of
results is clearly revealed in the last two columns of Table 10.However,
because kurtosis also increases among native Canadians, a finding we had no
reason to expect, we are reluctant to view our results for the immigrants as
conclusive.It would thus appear that a fuller understanding of the
dynamics of immigrants' labor market outcomes and their outmigration
23decisions awaits the advent of true, large-scale, longitudinal surveys of
inunigrants.
III.Conclusion
This paper has reported estimates of simple wage equations fit to
cross-sectional and pseudo-longitudinal data for Canadian immigrants in the
1971 and 1981 Canadian censuses.The estimates are used to assess (1) the
usefulness of cross-sectional analyses for measuring the pace of immigrant
earnings growth, (2) the labor market implications of admissions policies
that place different weights on the work skills possessed by prospective
entrants, and (3) the relative impact of selective outmigration and job-
matching on the shape of immigrant earnings distributions as duration of
stay increases.
The estimates provide evidence of a small to moderate assimilation
effect that suggests that immigrants make up for relatively low entry wages,
although the wage catch-up is not complete until 13 to 22 years after entry
into Canada.These results are revealed clearly in both the pseudo-
longitudinal and the cross-sectional analyses.The estimates also provide
evidence that the unobserved quality of immigrants' labor market skills
declined following changes in Canada's immigration policies in 1974 that led
to a sharp increase in the proportion of immigrants admitted on the basis of
family ties.Finally, since there is no evidence that the variance of
immigrant earnings increases with their duration of stay in Canada, and
since there are no differential immigrant-native changes in higher-order
moments of the earnings distribution as duration of stay increases, the
results are inconclusive with respect to the importance of selective
outmigration and job matching in the evolution of immigrant earnings
distributions over time.
24Table 1
Immigration to Canada by Category of Admission
Percent Admitted
Total Number of Percent Admitted from Independent
Non-Refugee as Sponsored or Applications
Year Immigrants Assisted Relatives (including refugees)
SponsoredAssisted
TotalRelativesRelatives
1954-58 839,045 33.0 n.a. n.a. 67.0
1960-64 456,143 44.6 na. n.a. 55.4
1965-69 909,882 37.8 n.a. n.a. 62.2
1970-74 785,079 49.3 24.7 24.6 50.7
1975-79 593,862 67.6 45.2 22.4 32.4
1980-84 468,731 64.2 54.2 10.0 35.8
n.a.not available
SOURCE:Employment and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration Levels, selected years.Table 2




Year jj millions) Foreign-born
1901 5.4 13.0
1911 7.2 22.0
5 1921 8.8 22.3
T 1931 10.4 22.2
O 1941 11.5 17.5
C 1951 14.0 14.7
K 1961 18.2 15.6
5 1971 21.6 15.3
1981 24.1 16.1
Ratio of
Population Number of Immigrants
Increase Immigrantsto Population
Period(thousands) (thousands) Increase
1901-11 1836 1759 0.96
1911-21 1581 1612 1.02
F 1921-31 1589 1203 0.76
L 1931-41 1130 150 0.13
O 1941-51 2502 548 0.22
W 1951-61 4229 1543 0.37
5 1961-71 3330 1429 0.43
1971-81 2515 1447 0.58
SOURCE: Author calculations based on data reported in Immigration
Statistics Ottawa:Supply and Services, 1985.Table 3
Distribution of Intended Occupations Among Canadian Immigrants
Planning to Work, by Year of Immigration (in percent)
Q Immigration
Occupation 1979-831974-781969-731964-681959-631954-58
Managerial 6.3 7.5 5.1 2.4 2.1 1.4
Professional 21.5 22.5 26.7 25.3 17.3 10.8
Clerical 11.4 14.7 15.0 13.5 11.9 10.2
Service 8.2 9.7 11.1 9.6 16.5 14.4
Agriculture 4.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 7.5 9.2
Construction 4.2 7.1 6.7 8.8 7.7 9.8
Manufacturing 19.0 22.2 20.9 23.9 18.4 21.8
and Mechanical
Laborers 1.3 1.5 2.4 7.2 12.1 13.9
Other* 24.0 12.6 9.0 6.1 6.5 8.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*"Other"includes Transportation and Communication, Conimercial and
Financial, Logging, Fishing, Trapping and Hunting, Mining and
Quarrying, and Unspecified.
SOURCE:1954-73:Employment and Immigration Canada, Annual Report
Parliament on Immigration Levels. Q,p.l4.
1974-83:Author calculations based on information reported
in annual issues of Immigration Statistics (Employment and
Immigration Canada)Table 4
Canadian Immigrants by Country of Origin and Year of Immigration, 1981
Immigration
Country of 197619711966196119561946pre-
Origin j Q . Total
Africa 233 390 255 106 39 16 14 1053
Asia 19751720 889 245 209 201 75 5314
Zelgium/Luxemburg 20 12 25 10 55 72 34 228
britain 690 8741209 646110418332324 8680
France 65 67 122 67 69 102 19 511
Germany 73 92 213 176 473 764 84 1875
Greece 36 139 229 169 176 84 18 851
Ireland 20 26 29 12 31 19 23 160
Italy 86 182 703 71810681030 127 3914
Latin America 7931080 633 149 95 68 35 2853
Netherlands 53 46 90 64 255 848 31 1387
Other Europe* 399 778 999 456 869 848 718 5067
Other Non-Europe** 89 113 95 31 25 29 12 394
Poland 58 59 78 87 121 541 473 1417
Soviet Union 80 34 28 21 49 614 476 1302
U.S. 394 529 466 191 155 2001007 2942
Total 506461416063314847937269547037948
*MOtherEurope" includes Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, and non-Soviet
and Eastern Zloc countries.
**"OtherNon-Europe" includes Australia, Pacific Islands, and other
areas not otherwise listed.
SOURCE: Canadian Census of Population, l-in-l00 sample. Data
includes all immigrants (place of birth other than Canada)
except inmates, members of the armed forces, and
immigrants who arrived in 1981.Table 5
Selected Labor Market Characteristics of
Immigrants and Natives Aged 25-64 in 1981
Immigrants Natives
Labor Force Participation 72.4 73.6
Rate (ages 15 and over,
in percent)
Percent who worked 49 or 70.6 70.4
more weeks in 1980
Percent working 35 or 93.3 91.9
more hours during the
Census reference week
Percent self-employed 15.3 13.3
Unemployment rate 5.3 8.5
(in percent)
Average wage and salary 20.4 19.0




SOURCE:Authors' tabulations of 1981 Census data.Table 6
Immigrant Labor Force Participation, Unemployment, and Income,
by Year of Immigration, for Males in the 1971 and 1981 Censuses
n.a.not applicable














i1 1221 22L11Q 121Q
Pre-1946 29 47 4.4 4.6 23.4 18.8
1946-55 77 89 3.6 4.1 22.9 17.5
1956-60 84 86 3.9 5.0 21.1 17.0
1961-65 84 85 5.3 5.3 19.9 15.9
1966-70 82 81 6.1 6.1 21.1 14.8
1971-75 81 n.a. 6.7 n.a. 18.2 n.a.
1976-80 73 n.a. 8.0 n.a. 15.0 n.a.
Total 72 74 5.3 4.9 20.4 16.8Table 7
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
for Male Immigrants and Natives in 1971 and 1981 [*]
VariablesDefinitions Immiarants Natives
inin u2iin
LNWAG log previous year's wage 8.795 9.754 8.710 9.667
and salary income, (0.622)(0.660) (0.691)(0.689)
nominal dollars
years since immigration 15.121 18.383
(8.884) (10.151)
SCH education in years 10.51511.237 10.27711.088
(3.426)(3.269) (2.963)(2.671)
work experience in years 23.708 23.730 21.320 19.079
(13.162) (12.371) (13.380) (12.806)
marital status dununy 0.802 0.806 0.762 0.725
(1-current1y married)
1117680 immigrated 1976-1980 -- 0.104
1M7175 immigrated 1971-1975 -- 0.165
1M6670 immigrated 1966-1970 0.218 0.189
1M6165 immigrated 1961-1965 0.111 0.103
1115660 immigrated 1956-1960 0.187 0.164
1M4655 immigrated 1946-1955 0.338 0.230
Sample Size 8,290 9,368 5,119 6,295
Notes for Tables 7-9
The immigrant samples represent l-in-lO0 samples of all immigrants in
each Canadian census aged 20-64 who report working positive weeks and hours,
who earned more than 50 cents per hour in the 1971 Census (one dollar per
hour in the 1981 Census), and who are not primarily self-employed.Inmates,
members of the armed forces, and immigrants arriving during the year in
which the census was taken are excluded from the sample.
The native samples represent l-in-600 samples of all natives in each
Canadian census.The samples were constructed using the same criteria as
those used to construct the immigrant sample, of those criteria that are
relevant.
The regressions include vectors of categorical variables with
information on hours worked per week and weeks worked per year.Table 8
Estimated Wage Equationi for Immigranta and Natives





















*SeeNotes at bottom of Table 7






YSM(xIMMIG) .0044 .0053 ——
(.0007) (.0006)
SCH .0427 .0447 .0670
(.0022) (.0018) (.0025)
EXP .0376 .000 .0405
(.0016) (.0017) (.0021)
EXPSQ(—100) — .0681 — .0692 —.0655
(.0030) (.0033) (.0042)
MST .1569 .1820 .1963
(.0137) (.0132) (.0169)
IMMIG
Constant 6.6074 6.6777 6.1279
(.0751) (.0683) (.0676)
R2 .485 .509 .554
RSS 1651.0 2004.9 1089.9
N 8290 9368 5119TabI. 9
Wage Equations for Mate Immigranta in Canada Baaed on Pooled 1971 and 1961 Data *
Within-CohortsModel Within-Cohorts Modal
Croaa-CohortsWithinCohorteUsing Sample Average Using Weighted Average
Model Model ProdurtivityAdjustment Productivity Adjustment
.0076 .0202 .0024 .0042
(.0005) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
SCM .0460 .0437 .0437 .0389
(0013) (.0013) (.0013) (.0013)
EX? .0401 .0383 .0383 .0401
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
EXPSQ(—100) —.0719 —.0675 —.0675 -.0703
(.0022) (.0022) (.0022) (.0022)
.1711 .1723 .1723 .1680
(.0096) (.0095) (.0095) (.0095)
CONSTANT 6,6467 6.1493 6.8620 6.8628
(.0508) (.0564) (.0564) (.0563)
1M7660 .4713 —.1874 —.1163
(.0302) (.0302) (.0302)
1M7175 .5062 —.0634 —.0066
(.0261) (.0251) (.0260)
1M5570 .4548 —.0259 .0142
(.0241) (.0241) (.0240)
1M6155 .3684 —.0233 .0116
(.0224) (.0224) (.0223)
1M5660 .2730 —.0296 —.0034
(.0189) (.0189) (.0188)
1M4655 .1676 —.0104 —.0026
(.0155) (.0155) (.0154)
.00494 .00506 .00496 .00501
RSS 37.663 36.757 36.757 36.612
N 17658 17658 17658 17658
*SeeNotes at bottom of Table 7
Estimated standard errors are reported in parenth.s.s below coefficient estimates.Table 10
Dispersion and Kurtosis in Conditional and Unconditional
Distributions of Wage and Salary Income,
for Male Immigrants, by Census Year [*]
Std. Dev. of Std. Dev. of Kurtosis of
Immigrant Residuals in Residuals in
Sample! Earnings Log Earnings LogEarnings
Entry Cohort (000 dollars) Equation Equation
1221i2 12fl 121
Allpre-1970 12.211.0 0.450.44 29 3.7
immigrants
Native 11.810.9 0.460.47 2.3 2.8
Canadians
Pre-1946 15.7l22 0.480.46 3.0 2.4
1946-55 11.3l08 0.420.42 3.6 4.6
1956-60 11.010.4 0.410.44 2.5 5.0
1961-65 10.311.4 044 0.46 2.6 3.5
1966-70 12.610.9 0.550.47 2l 3.3
[*]The equation used to estimate the residuals and to calculate their
standard deviation and kurtosis is reported in column 3 of Table 9.References
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